NATO in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, Fighting Alone by David P. Auerswald & Stephen M. Saideman

Author:David P. Auerswald & Stephen M. Saideman [Auerswald, David P. & Saideman, Stephen M.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: International Relations, Political Science, Diplomacy
ISBN: 9780691170879
Google: UBQ0jgEACAAJ
Goodreads: 26597408
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Published: 2013-12-22T00:00:00+00:00

Minority Government and Divided Opposition

In theory, the formal commander in chief of the Canadian forces is the governor general, who is technically an agent of the king or queen of Canada. In reality, the prime minister is empowered by Canadian governing institutions to make decisions in times of conflict and has generally delegated military decisions to the CDS. Usually, Canada’s prime minister is quite powerful, having been delegated significant authority from the majority party in Parliament. The parliamentary rank and file have little influence over daily conflict decisions and exercise practically no oversight over military operations. Indeed, members of Parliament do not even have security clearances, greatly restricting their access to pertinent information.

That parliament was a relatively weak player when it came to military deployments may seem surprising given recent Canadian election results. The majority Liberal Party government elected in 2000 was followed by minority party rule under the Liberals in 2004 and the Conservatives in 2006 and 2008. One would think that minority government cabinets would be sensitive to opposition party concerns, if only to avoid no-confidence votes, giving Parliament significant influence over how the military was used (Lagassé 2010). That was not the case, however, in large part because the makeup of the four major political parties made it nearly impossible to form a stable opposition coalition. The two main parties, the Conservatives and Liberals, were on opposite sides of most issues. The Bloc Québécois party was not an appealing or viable partner due to its separatist agenda, and instead was a spoiler to the hopes of a left-leaning coalition of the Liberals and the New Democratic Party. The result was that Canadian prime ministers, even when leading minority governments, were in a strong position to make policy, or delegate that authority to a trusted surrogate—in this case the CDS.

That said, because Canada’s was a minority government, Parliament had to periodically reauthorize the overall Canadian mission in Afghanistan, which, in theory, allowed it to exert some influence over the conduct of the Canadian mission in Afghanistan.66 Prime Minister Stephen Harper had to ask Parliament to extend the mission in Afghanistan on a couple of occasions, with the last mandate expiring in 2011. The Liberals were sufficiently divided on Afghanistan that Harper was able to get enough votes for short extensions of the mission. Moreover, failing to authorize Canadian participation is a very blunt stick. Yet even somewhat less blunt alternatives, such as caveats, were not required by Parliament. There was some brief discussion during the 2008 mandate debate about restricting the CF from engaging in offensive operations, but this did not get very far. Instead, the day-to-day management of Afghan operations was left in the hands of the CDS and his subordinates.

Technically, the governor general selects the CDS, a four-leaf officer, upon the advice of the prime minister. In reality, the prime minister selects the CDS, who serves at the pleasure of the prime minister. The CDS then decides how Canadian forces operate. That said, the CDS must consider what the prime minister will tolerate or else be replaced.

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